USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT





THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND MARINE CORPS

by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD E. BLOSS United States Army

> COLONEL DAVID R. BROOKS Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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There has been an ongoing battle between the two dominant land forces in the world, the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps. This ongoing struggle transcends from the tactical to the strategic level in the fight for resources and in some cases survival of force structure necessary to protect our nation. The United States military land forces of the Army and Marine Corps have a dysfunctional rather than a cooperative, direct relationship to each other to operate, organize, train, and equip the military land component. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, these two separate and distinct land forces find themselves for the past decade in a great debate over their roles, responsibilities, and missions. Both forces compete for the same resources, often the same missions, and both attempt to define their role in the new world order (or disorder) within our national security strategy.



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project has been a career long question. Never have I completely understood why this conflict even exists. Spending a majority of my career in the light, airborne, and air assault infantry, the opportunities to build upon interoperability, service cohesion, and common understanding through training and operations have been missed. This paper is not about dissolving the Marine Corp or making it a smaller twin of the Army, but of capitalizing on the capabilities of each and developing better understanding of how these two unique organizations may improve future joint operations. This is for the future soldiers and marines to bring light to a potential seam in our land forces and to set aside service bias without losing the distinctive service pride that both organizations share.

Special acknowledgement to Colonel David Brooks whose faith, guidance, and patience allowed me to see this project to completion. Additionally, to the many leaders I have had the privilege of serving, but specifically to Colonel Ed Filiberti, my unofficial mentor, who continually challenged me to live up to his high standards of performance and expectations throughout my twenty years of service. I acknowledge how his personal example served to inspire and motivate me to continue to strive for excellence and remember that there are always twenty-four hours in a day. Lastly, to the gallant men and women of our armed forces who serve in many thankless ways every hour of every day, whose individual sacrifices exceed any recognizable reward we can bestow upon them.



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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND MARINE CORPS

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The United States Army and Marine Corps find themselves in conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Army and Marine Corps have conducted a great debate over their mutual roles, responsibilities, and missions as America's and the world's most dominate land forces. Both forces compete for the same resources, and often the same missions, and unsurprisingly, at times developed an adversarial relationship. It is essential that their roles be integrated, defined for better cooperation, have complementary missions, and achieve synergy from the combined capabilities of each service. An uncoordinated effort threatens and undermines the U. S. National Security Strategy as well as potential costs on the future battlefield.

The entire question revolves around interoperability between the Army and Marine Corps to achieve optimal results. Certainly, after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, each service started in the right direction, but has the pace accelerated, decreased, or stopped? How truly interoperable are the Army and Marine Corps? Interoperability consists of the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to operate effectively together. 1 Comparing the doctrine, organization, training, material, and leadership of each organization provides the backdrop for observations and comparison. Doctrine will include appropriate United States Code Title 10 directives and responsibilities, Department of Defense directives, and service doctrine for comparison. Organization, training and operations of each service will highlight how each service has operated in specific "joint" operations and how training has affected operational performance. The material aspect of each service that will be compared includes the acquisition, transformation, and interoperability of both services. Lastly, the leadership aspect of both services includes joint oversight, visions of the services, and leader training. In conclusion, critical joint service issues will be highlighted that affect future operations and discussion for improved effectiveness and application.

VIGNETTE

Two Commanders are given a mission to begin the offense. They are assigned parallel zones of operation adjacent to each other. The first Commander turns to his baseline doctrinal manual for operations in the offense. Opening his doctrinal manual, he reviews the appropriate reference and finds the different options for him by types of offensive operations. For the

offense, the types prescribed are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. He can use several forms of maneuver to include, envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and frontal attack. The second commander does the same and reviews his organizational doctrine for the offense. When reviewing his doctrine, the second Commander finds his options for types of offensive operations include movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. He now checks the forms of maneuver available to him and reviews the envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, frontal attack, and flanking attack. Each doctrine identifies relatively similar options, but with different forms of maneuver and are described by different authors with different interpretations and nuances based on their respective experience, style, and approval by their organizational leadership. Differences as subtle as the direction of the envelopment as in Figures 1 and 2 from the opposite directions




FIGURE 1. USA ENVELOPMENT




FIGURE 2. USMC ENVELOPMENT

as well as the penetration followed by the envelopment in the Army example highlighted in the diagrams could have significant effects on the battlefield. Both are concerned after their past experience and doctrinal differences in the defense. The first Commander's doctrinal types of defense were the mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde.⁵ The second Commander's

doctrinal types of defense were the mobile defense and the position defense. Each Commander clearly understands that if their respective baseline doctrine is not integrated at the top, the ramifications as it is interpreted down the chain of command continue to widen the gap, based on education, experience, interpretation, and understanding. Both are concerned that the missions of the offense and defense represent only two of the dozens of collective tasks that the two units could be expected to perform in unison for success, not to mention the supporting tasks that accompany them. The first Commander looks over his formations and sees the latest tank accompanied with the latest infantry-fighting vehicle. The second Commander gazes toward his formations and sees the same model tank, but a generation earlier, not equipped with the latest acquisition and targeting system and with other first generation capabilities, based on the modernization efforts of his comrades organization. His infantry fighting vehicles are primarily wheeled, compared to the tracked vehicles of the first Commander. The second Commander knows he has neither the firepower nor mobility of the first Commander, nor the sustainment base. The first Commander is confident in his men; he designed his training plan in accordance with his organizational training doctrinal model, executed it rigorously, and personally certified his subordinates, leaders, and units prior to this deployment. His subordinates understand him, his personality, his intent, and the staff and his subordinate Commanders know their roles, what decisions they are authorized, and have the cohesion and confidence of having working together and tested theory by practice and exercise. The second Commander joined his unit just prior to deployment. His unit was trained and certified using rigorous and high standards, but different standards, doctrine, methodology, and a different focus and mission sets from his comrade. Another Commander oversaw the training and certification of his men, subordinates, leaders, and units. The second Commander is highly qualified and confident, but has not achieved the level of cohesion that shared hardship and tough training provides through mutual experience. The second Commander has conducted training while deployed, where subordinate Commanders and staff have learned to understand him, his personality, and intent, but not to the level or degree of the first Commander. The first Commander uses the experience gained in home station training to refine the standard operating procedures through experience and used a system called Field Battle Command at Brigade and Below (FBCB2) while the second Commander did not have the opportunity to command his unit prior to deployment and uses the Uniform Operations Center (UOC) to command and control his unit. Logistics procedures and automation are separate and distinct in both forces despite some commonality among their systems. There are different naming conventions, a different sensor to shooter architecture, and their air defense capabilities are not

fully compatible. To the novice, these two Commanders appear to be from different nations in a coalition operation. The military professional understands the first Commander is a United States Army Officer and the second Commander is a United States Marine Corps Officer. Ironically, as part of the United States dominant land maneuver forces, they in all probability have never attended a common service school that would prepare them for combat within a common framework. Their exposure has been primarily through personal professional development, casual associations, and rudimentary briefings in their respective service schools professional development programs. Each officer has stayed the predictable and patterned course to command which resulted in neither having served tours of duty in the other's service for fear of getting "off-track." These surprising differences, apparent lack of common ground, and other challenges highlight the relationship of the Army and Marines.

MISPERCEPTIONS

Despite the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 into law, there continues to exist a significant gap of understanding between the Army and Marine Corps. A recent joint working group of twelve field grade officers from both services established to understand Army-Marine Corps transformation efforts started their efforts to dispel the misperceptions that exist today despite the efforts of 'Jointness.'⁹ This is just the beginning of the lack of understanding and misperceptions between the two services when describing interoperability, command control communications intelligence security and intelligence, fire support, leader development, vision, and the genesis for competition between these two land forces for missions and resources.

There are strong misperceptions between the Army and Marines. Both have rich and proud histories and there is a natural and, in some cases, healthy rivalry between the services. There is a belief in the Army that the Marine Corps is an amphibious force. Their equipment



fielding is designed for operations around the sea and on land. Training is developed to operate around the littoral. Title 10 even directs that the Marine Corps is responsible for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. The Marine Corps could be better defined as an



FIGURE 3. DA SEAL

FIGURE 4. USMC SEAL

expeditionary force with amphibious capabilities but it highlights the perceived roles vice directed roles of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps perceives that the Army is fielding three

separate Armies. The first called the Legacy Force consists of those systems currently in the field and the modernization of those systems. The second, the Interim Force, built around the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, fills the strategic capability requirement for rapid strategic deployment around the world for an emerging crisis. The last, being the Objective Force, as the future combat force, combines the revolution of military affairs including technology, training, and system integration into a force that capitalizes on the seamless incorporation of a systems of systems including command and control, intelligence, fires, and situational awareness that will provide the future Army Commander an unprecedented level for a common relevant operational picture of the battlefield. These three forces have caused a misperception in the Marine Corps who view the Interim and Objective Forces as potential threats to their expeditionary role when coupled with legacy Army forced entry capabilities in a potential expeditionary role.

DOCTRINE AND DIRECTIVES

TITLE 10

United States Code, Title 10, defines United States policy for the military services and by law establishes the requirements for the service to preserve the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States. Additionally, military forces support national policies, implement national objectives, and overcomes any nation responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. For the Army, Section 3062 outlines the provisions for the Army. "In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport, as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. Additionally, the Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned." 12

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVES

Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 identifies numerous functions of the Army. Of note the selected pertinent functions of the Army are as follows:

- (6.6.1.2.1) To organize, train and equip forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.
- (6.6.1.2.3.1) Develop, in coordination with other Military Services, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not provided for elsewhere.
- (6.6.1.2.8) To develop doctrines and procedures, in accordance with the other
 Military Services, for organizing, equipping, training, and employing forces operating
 on land, except that the development of doctrines and procedures for organizing,
 equipping, training, and employing Marine Corps units for amphibious operations
 shall be a function of the Marine Corps coordinating as required, with the other
 services.¹³

Taken literally, under the authority of Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, the Army has the responsibility to develop the doctrine and procedures for organizing, equipping, training and employment of forces operating on land less amphibious operations that are a function of the Marine Corps. As highlighted in the scenario between our two Commanders, each operate from a different doctrinal manual, are organized differently, equipped differently, and follow different standards and priorities of training. Not all these differences are inherently bad, but for missions conducted on land each service should operate from the same doctrinal manual and train these missions to the same baseline standards.

THE ARMY AND MARINE CORPS MISSIONS

The Army Mission is taken directly from Title 10 directives. Expanding on this mission in Army Field Manual 1, The Army, the purpose of the Army is to fight and win our Nation's wars. ¹⁴ The unique contribution to national security is prompt, sustained, land dominance across the range of military operations and the spectrum of conflict. Further defined in the manual are the Army core competencies of shaping the security environment, prompt response, mobilize the Army, forcible entry operations, sustained land dominance, and support to civil authorities. ¹⁵

These resolutions, directives, and mandates highlight specific Army responsibilities and when distilled, highlights that the Army shall be organized, trained, and equipped for prompt and sustained combat operations (incident) on land. The key component is that the Army is responsible for the preparation for land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of land warfare. Taken literally, Directive 6.6.1.2.8 gives the Army doctrinal and procedural oversight

for employment of forces operating on land less those Marine forces involved in amphibious operations. The question exists, with the directive, has the Army exercised that authority over the Marine Corps for implementation, oversight for the organization, equipping, and training of the Marine Corps for the employment of forces operating on land?

Title 10, Section 5063 states that "The Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. "16 Title 10 directives to the Marines, when compared to historical precedence and service doctrine differ in both service doctrine and operational application. Directives in the code specify that Marine land forces are organized, trained, and equipped to support the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign, serve on armed Navy vessels, and protection of Naval property. The President directs any operations in excess of these fundamental missions.

DOCTRINAL COMPARISON

Doctrine for each service is different. Great strides have been accomplished between the Army and Marines since the enactment of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, however each service continues to publish their own specific doctrine to meet their service needs. Doctrinal headquarters for the Army is at Fort Monroe, Virginia while doctrinal headquarters for the Marine Corps is at Camp Lejeune, Virginia. The collaboration and coordination in the operational manuals is self-evident, however has the Army fulfilled the directive 5100.1 for responsibility for land warfare? How receptive has the Marine Corps been in accepting this directive and deferring responsibility for land warfare to the Army? The differences in doctrinal publications starting in each service operations, FM 3-0 for the Army, and MCDP 1-0, for the Marine Corps, answer the question.

Each service has different missions, but the intersection and common ground literally and figuratively is that both operate on land whether the littoral or inland. The Army is trained and

equipped for sustained land combat, and in general, focuses on those mission essential tasks associated with sustained ground combat operations. The Marine Corps, trained and equipped for expeditionary warfare, in general, focuses on those missions essential to expeditionary warfare in the littoral. The discussion and mutual confusion, as dictated by Title 10, are not clear. Marine operations on land in support of naval campaigns, and the Army role of sustained land combat, but where does the littoral end? What are the expectations for truly joint operations at the littoral and beyond for each force? Should this be a geographic point on the ground to divide responsibilities and control? What roles and responsibilities do the Army, Marines, and Joint Community have to take to ensure the means and measures for interoperability, true integration and jointness between the Army and Marines for optimal performance to achieve future land dominance in a coordinated effort? This challenge is highlighted and negatively reinforced in how training and operations have placed each service in the same dilemma. The requirement for a common doctrine is exacerbated by the great potential for close coordination required in a major conflict. Diminishing Army force structure demands Army and Marine integration against most potential enemies, where the Marine Corps finds itself in a sustained land combat role rather than an expeditionary role through demand vice design.

TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

ROLES AND MISSION CONFUSION

The disparity between Title 10 and Department of Defense directives, recent operations, organization, and application understandably results in inter-service friction between the Army and Marine Corps. In recent history, the missions of the Marine Corps as directed by USC Title 10, have been expanded largely due to Marine Corps capabilities. In particular, responsiveness, forward presence, and combined arms capabilities have made the employment of forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units highly effective. Poignantly demonstrated in Afghanistan, with the Marine mission to seize Objective Rhino, over 500 miles inland, with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, Marine missions have deviated as prescribed in United States Code, Title 10. This expanded role has created inter-service chafing with the Army and its directed Title 10 responsibilities. According to Army Major Don Vandergriff, an armor officer who teaches at Georgetown University, "The seizure of an airfield near Kandahar is a textbook Army mission, yet it was the Marines, who operate near the shoreline, who performed it, it's a big slap in the face." From Marine Corps Spokesman Capt Joe Kloppelit, "It shows you how far the Marines can extend when they need to." These contrasting viewpoints reflect the

confusion within the ranks and highlight both service frustrations and expected ambiguity over service roles and missions.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Past operations and exercises have reiterated the challenges facing Joint Army and Marine interoperability, modernization, and compatibility. During Operation Desert Storm, an Army Brigade (1st Brigade, 2nd Armored Division) was attached as the only force in the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force initially with the M1 tank (figure 6) while Marine Armor consisted of the M60 tank (figure 5), over 20 years old.¹⁸



FIGURE 5. M60 TANK



FIGURE 6. M1A1 TANK

This was one of the few operations in recent history where an Army maneuver unit was ever attached to a Marine force. The differences between the M1 and M60 tanks capabilities as well as common logistics made this relationship a challenge. During Operation Restore/Uphold Democracy in Haiti, Marines were assigned objectives in Cape Haitia while Army forces were

over 100 miles away in Port au Prince. Grenada followed the same planning philosophy where geographic distances masked deficiencies in tactical and operational compatibility. Admiral Metcalf, overall Theater Commander in Grenada as the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 120, stated, "From the outset of the operation, I recognized the major participants (Marine Corps, the 82nd Airborne, and Rangers) would have different operational styles. A deliberate planned effort was made to keep the units (Army and Marines) separate. We wanted to make sure that marines would not shoot the army, and vice versa." This was an understatement from the Navy Admiral. The challenges to interoperability were readily apparent. The operation in Grenada was a watershed for joint operations, that affected significant change in the joint community, but have we gone far enough?

JOINT TRAINING

Joint training scenarios reiterate this separation of forces methodology and practice. The significant joint exercise Purple Dragon exercised by XVIII Airborne Corps as JTF-180 has integrated the Marine Corps into the exercise. Unfortunately like our historical precedence, the exercise includes the Marine Corps conducting operations at Camp Lejeune and the Army conducting exercises at Fort Bragg. The more likely scenarios of the Marine Corps seizing a beachhead, Army forced entry forces attacking and seizing deep targets, followed by heavy mechanized formations conducting reception, staging, and onward movement and attacking from the beachhead has not been exercised. Likewise, the Marine concept of operations in their Strategy 21 where "Forward-deployed MEUs serve as advance echelons of MEBs, which in turn serve as advance echelons of MEFs."²⁰ This singular service paradigm must shift to joint land force considerations and service interoperability achieving the effects and synergy that both the Army and Marine Corps can apply. As the CJCS advocates, "Effective power projection requires a combination of both overseas and CONUS-based capabilities that provide maximum flexibility to the warfighting commander."²¹ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise program directs the only joint training that occurs. Unfortunately in recent years this program has received significant financial cuts and the level and frequency of these directed joint exercises bear the results. Neither service has taken the initiative to coordinate joint training of any significance to achieve interoperability.

NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE

Joint Vision 2020 describes the future battlefield, where the joint force is capable of dominant maneuver, possessing unmatched speed and agility in positioning and repositioning tailored forces from dispersed locations to achieve operational objectives quickly and

decisively.²² Operation Desert Storm served as a defining moment in warfare and the conduct of war and provided the catalyst to the possibilities in Joint Vision 2020. Where the wars of the past required long campaigns to achieve decisive military and political objectives, Desert Storm achieved these objectives in miraculous speed and time. The nature of modern warfare has changed the definition of sustained land combat for the Army. Likewise, an expeditionary force is an armed force organized to accomplish an objective in a foreign country.²³ The definition of expeditionary force is so broad it fails to describe the specific role of the Marines. Previously, the Army supported by the Marines fought the long campaigns of the past. The nature of modern warfare turns sustained land combat into a matter of weeks rather than the months and years of past conflict, again blurring the roles of the Army and the Marines. In the new security environment coupled with technological advancements, the Army finds itself closer to an expeditionary role while the Marine Corps finds itself in a sustained land combat role as defined by the duration and speed of modern warfare.

MATERIAL AND ACQUISITION

BUDGET

The Army Fiscal Year (FY) 03 operations and maintenance budget for 2003 is \$30.6 billion. Additionally, the Army budget for procurement is \$13.8 billion and research and development funding is \$6.9 billion. This funding resources an end strength of 480,000 Active Component soldiers. The Marine Corps budget is nested within the Department of the Navy budget. For the Marine Corps, the Operations and Maintenance budget for FY 03 is \$3.35 billion with a procurement budget of \$1.28 billion. This budget resources an end strength of 175,000 Active Component marines. Within the Navy budget there is no separate Research, Development, Test and Evaluation budget for the Marine Corps. Vast resources and manpower are being directed in separate directions in regards to achieving joint land dominance, precluding the development of a single coordinated joint land warfare vision. The magnitude of the resources, relative manpower comparisons, and global security environment tied to U.S. interests prescribe the requirement.

The Army serves the majority of Marine Corps research and development needs with the exception of C4ISR and logistics systems that the Marine Corps have developed independently. With the pace of modernization, transformation, and the revolution of military affairs there is a growing disparity between systems integration between Army and the Marines. Examples include interoperability issues between the Stryker-IBCT/Objective Forces and Marine Expeditionary Forces C4ISR architecture, logistics interface between Army CSSCS and Marine

Seaway/Loggy, command and control interface between Army FBCB2 and Marine UOC, Fires integration of High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) and Naval Surface Fires Support System interface, Integrated Air Defense coordination between Army Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3)/Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) and Marine Complementary Low Altitude Weapons System (CLAWS) and Naval Theater Air and Cruise Missile Defense. Compounding these problems are fourteen different naming conventions for military units. ²⁶

SERVICE ACQUISITION

To highlight the costs, a single Army acquisition program system, Land Warrior, will cost \$2 billion for 45,000 sets fielded between 2001 through 2004 with an original unit cost of



FIGURE 7. ARMY LAND WARRIOR

\$35,000 expected to decrease to \$15,000 once in full production.²⁷ This cost represents a fraction of the requirement based on force structure. With respective budget comparisons the Marine Corps cannot hope to match funding much less fielding. This creates a gap not only from the operational maneuver capabilities between the Army and Marines based on training and acquisition as demonstrated, but down to the individual small unit and rifleman. Land Warrior is one system among dozens that each service is pursuing to sustain land

dominance. The Army and the Marine Corps are just beginning to understand the scope of the problem with solutions years away due to budget cycles and program schedules. Service acquisition has tremendous impacts on joint interoperability yet remains service specific with the primary challenge being consensus between the Army and the Marine Corps.

INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES

Of the top ten Joint Interoperability issues, most have direct correlations from a lack of interoperability between the Army and Marines. These include tactical data link deficiencies; combat identification, blue force precision location information, joint composite tracking network, Army and Marine digitization (Maneuver Control System-MCS and Tactical Combat Operations-TCO incompatibilities), joint collaborative planning tools, and intelligence systems interoperability. The Department of Defense Office of Systems Interoperability, identified the problems, but implementation strategies have not been able to achieve uniform service agreement, nor relative effects with funding set well into the future years. In fact, the problems are getting larger as services transform, complex multiple systems are developed individually and fixes to past problems are applied in a stove-piped fashion. ²⁸

Revolutionary developments alone will leave the Army and Marine Corps incompatible in terms of both technology and how new technology influences emerging doctrine. Stryker Brigades will complement Army forced entry forces and provide the immediate lethality, survivability, protection, and information dominance for the future battlefield. This capability impinges on Marine Corps Strategy 21 that advocates the Marine Corps as the "Premier Expeditionary Force."

This demonstrates the inefficient use of resources in redundant capabilities along with conflicting, self-evident strategic visions and directions. The challenge remains, who has oversight of dominant land warfare? Do the Army and the Marines continue their respective course or is there a lead service or department for synchronized land warfare that has directive oversight of interoperability, common vision, resourcing, and implementation strategy? If we have no common direction how can we achieve the desired joint results?

LEADERSHIP

JOINT OVERSIGHT

The Goldwater-Nichols, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 along with assigning the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs increased responsibilities, assigned significant authority for assessing military requirements for acquisition programs. To fulfill the additional acquisition responsibilities, the Joint Readiness Oversight Committee (JROC) was named to replace the existing Joint Requirements and Management Board. The JROC consists of the four services vice chiefs with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) as the permanent chairman. This organization, although comprised of powerful leaders of their respective services, gave it the appearance, and was described as the junior varsity with the Service Chiefs and Chairman the varsity, by those in the Pentagon.³¹ The JROC, although formed with best intentions, found itself in the same dilemma as prior to 1986, bound by consensus. Since the Service Vice-Chiefs each has major acquisition, program, and budget responsibilities within their services, major decisions are made in their service vice a joint capacity.32 This construct has made the JROC a forum for information sharing, vice a joint decision making body. The VCJCS serves as the only true joint representative, acting for the benefit of combined community instead of service interests and bias. The result of this condition is that since its creation many of the issues that the JROC was designed to address, such as roles and missions, force structure, and resource distribution among the services has been largely avoided. 33 As a result, the requirement for consensus in the JROC has produced an agenda that focused on smaller issues that were more palatable for service Vice Chiefs of Staff.

Services have structured their staffs to prepare JROC issues. Additionally, another layer in the process has been added, known as the JROC Review Board (JRB). The JRB was added and designed to provide a structured process of service two star level oversight similar to the JROC for shaping the agenda and proposals prior to presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³⁴ The result of this combined layering, service interests, and requirement for consensus was that major issues were withdrawn, reconsidered, or never presented to the JROC. The most telling revelation of the diffusion of the process of potential contentious issues is that one JROC official acknowledged that he could recall no instance where the JROC failed to approve a requirement or support a system that a service wanted.³⁵

SERVICE VISIONS

The Army Vision links the Army mission and core competencies. "The Army Vision, consists of three interdependent elements: people, readiness, and transformation. People will remain the centerpiece of all we (the Army) do, soldiers, civilians, retirees, and veterans. Nonnegotiable readiness, the foundation of our contract with the American people and win the Nations wars, hinges on the well being of our people. Transformation, a process, defines how we change the way we think and fight in order to develop the capabilities required in the 21st Century."³⁶ Fundamental to the Marine Corps vision is that the Marine Corps will make marines to win the nations battles and create quality citizens, optimize the Corps' operating forces, support and sustainment base, and unique capabilities, sustain the enduring relationship with the United States Navy, reinforce the strategic partnerships with the sister services, contribute to the development of joint, allied, coalition, and interagency capabilities, and lastly, capitalize on innovation, experimentation, and technology.³⁷ Taken independently both the visions of the Army and Marines have lit the path towards great success. Each has created the greatest land force capabilities in our nation's history, but separate and distinct for each service. Under this analogy is the path for each service parallel, intersecting, and most importantly, does the path of each take it to the same destination? Senior leaders of each service must judge, with performance the jury, to determine if the way down separate paths justified the ends produced by an uncertain performance on the future joint battlefield.

TOWARDS THE FUTURE

As currently structured each service continues down their separate path. The previous discussions define two separate destinations and fail to meet the vision of Joint Vision 2020 as well as optimal performance on the future battlefield. Change in all organizations comes from the top down. Our obligations are to identify not only the potential problems, but also the

recommended solutions for decision. The simplest solution is to do nothing, accept the challenge as being too hard, and watch the continued friction, needless competition, and growing incompatibility increase between the Army and Marine Corps. Our National Security and Military Strategies along with limited resources, and expanding missions dictate and demand change for predictable performance in future operations on land. Proposed options may be applied individually or sequentially, but they must have the support of both Army and Marine senior leaders to understand change is in their respective services best interests for the future. As in every endeavor, leadership sets the conditions for success or failure through organizational rigor and implementation.

Within the current framework of USC Title 10, the Army and the Marine Corps must develop a better understanding of how they can be interchangeable and complementary. Doctrine is the tool to accomplish this task. Doctrine for employing forces operating on land is directed by the Department of Defense Directive 5100.1. This directive must be exercised and integrated into single service doctrine starting at the service operations manuals and permeate throughout the Marine Corps. Consensus between the Army and Marine Corps on the single doctrine for operations on land must be achieved to ensure compliance and effectiveness. Based on the increased role and requirement of the Marine Corps to operate as a land force, we must recognize that the Marine Corps has and will continue, as required, to serve in sustained land combat (as defined by modern warfare). The revision of Title 10 to meet this requirement will establish the law to implement change, or more importantly a change of thinking. The proponent for sustained land combat must still reside with the Army, but we are naive to think, as well as blind to historical precedence, that the Marine Corps will be required to only serve in an expeditionary role. The vastly diminished force structure of the Army since the 1980's, and the Marine Corp's relatively stable force structure make the combined operations in a theater a necessity against the majority of potential enemies.

After achieving doctrinal compliance and agreement between the Army and Marine Corps, change must be effected in training. Specifically, how do we train the Army-Marine Corps Team to operate more effectively on land? The Joint exercise program is designed to address this need, but needs the same evaluation rigor, frequency, and intensity as service certification. At the operational level, unit exchanges among Army light and air assault forces with Marine Forces at the small unit (up to company) level would enhance interoperability and familiarity. Based on these successes, larger unit rotations should be implemented. Joint participation in the Army Combat Training Centers with the Army and Marine Corps should be directed with appropriate scenarios. Creative, challenging, and realistic scenarios must capitalize on

coordinated, adjacent, and joint interoperability and force integration between the Army and Marine Corps. The requirements of close cooperation while operating in close proximity must be exercised in a challenging training environment. As previously described, the completely separate area of operations and tactics of past "Joint" operations must be avoided to achieve optimal combat effects on the future battlefield. These truly joint exercises would identify invaluable interoperability challenges across every battlefield operating system. Based on organizational training success, there is even potential for a light infantry unit to train, certify, and even participate as part of a Marine Expeditionary Unit during a deployment. Likewise a Marine Corps unit, once certified should deploy with an Army unit that is alerted for crisis. At the tactical level, an increase in service exchanges between the Army and Marine Corps will raise familiarity and interoperability. An exchange program currently exists, but is far too limited to have a significant impact on either service and only includes officers, not non-commissioned officers. Additionally, exchanges at the junior-grade to mid-grade officer level are not considered career enhancing. Incentives must be implemented to change this between both services including assigning joint credit for completion of a tour at the junior-grade and midgrade officer level as well as favoritism at respective service promotion boards. Already, several Army service schools meet Marine Corps needs. In those independent schools for each service, the periods of instruction, particularly at the junior-grade and mid-grade leadership levels, for both officer and enlisted, should be reviewed to examine where common ground can be achieved. Common baseline individual leader training will enhance collective performance in training and combat.

The potential for material and acquisition strategies to diverge along separate paths continues as long as each service controls their budgets without an interoperability focus. A common land doctrine, with common training will identify the shortcomings previously discussed in interoperability for acquisition and material strategies. A devoted effort to solve the interoperability issues, particularly in command and control, target acquisition, delivery systems is a necessity. The Army and the Marine Corps must achieve a common digitization framework to achieve these challenges. The potential for joint integrated transformation for land warfare, in lieu of separate service transformation, exists to facilitate a coordinated effort vice service vision for land warfare. Joint acquisition interoperability has been marginalized despite the best intentions in the JROC process. Recognize that the organization of the JROC with only the VCJCS, as the only real joint member, continues to avoid the tough decisions on roles and missions, force structure, and resource distribution. The JROC should be restructured to meet joint requirements. This would include an expansion of the members to also include Deputy

Commanders of Combatant Commands to avoid the natural service bias of service Vice Chiefs of Staff and their personal devotion to service programs. This restructuring would provide for service input and influence as well as better representation to the Combatant Commander who would ultimately employ these joint forces and systems.

Without senior leaders of the Army and Marine Corps endorsement and support, these initiatives are denied any hope of success. Mutual support, interoperability, and complementary missions are essential to the future relevance of each service and bind each service firmly together. Senior Leaders of the Army and Marine Corps must realize that optimization and efficiencies are readily gained by a coordinated, interoperable and multicapability based land force and lose single service bias. Change would provide a truly joint Army-Marine team for operations on land. Cooperation on training, acquisition and material fielding, funding, and strategic vision will provide a combined, integrated, capabilities based, joint land force prepared for a wide variety of threats and meet our national security and military strategy objectives. This force would meet the strategic concept for Joint Force Employment of decisive force, strategic agility, integrated operations, overseas presence, theater security cooperation and as well as innovation and transformation and leave us far better prepared for the challenges for the future. ³⁸

WORD COUNT = 6348

ENDNOTES

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- ² U.S. Department of the Army, <u>FM 3-0, Operations</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), 7-1.
 - ³ Ibid., 7-1.
- ⁴ U.S. Marine Corps, <u>MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, 27 September 2001), 7.
- ⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, <u>FM 3-0 Operations</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), 8-1.
- ⁶ U.S. Marine Corps. <u>MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, 27 September 2001), 8-16.
- ⁷ U.S. Marine Corps, "Army-Marine Corps Transformation Review" briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, D.C., Dec 2002.
 - ⁸ Ibid., 9-12.
 - ⁹ Ibid., 8.
 - ¹⁰ Title 10. United States Code. Section 5042, Subtitle C, Part I, Chapter 506, (2001).
 - ¹¹ <u>Title 10.</u> <u>United States Code</u>. Section 3062, Subtitle B, Part I, Chapter 307, (2001).
 - ¹² <u>Title 10. United States Code</u>. Section 3062, Subtitle B, Part I, Chapter 307, (2001).
- ¹³ Department of Defense. <u>DoD Directive 5100.1</u>. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1 August 2002), 6.6.1-6.6.2.5.4.
- ¹⁴ U.S. Department of the Army. <u>FM-1, The Army</u>. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 14 June 2001), Page 3-1.
 - ¹⁵ Ibid., 3-1.
 - ¹⁶ <u>Title 10.</u> <u>United States Code</u>. Section 5042, Subtitle C, Part I, Chapter 506, (2001).
- ¹⁷ Katherine McIntire Peters. "Marine Deployment Irks Soldiers." <u>Government Executive Magazine-Daily Briefing</u>, (29 November 2001): 1-2.
- ¹⁸ Tim Thompson, "Order of Battle for Marine Corps Expeditionary Force." <Available from http://www.tim-thompson.com/gwobmarine.html; Internet; accessed 7 October 2002.
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- ²² General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Vision 2020</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Staff, June 2000), 20.
- Department of Defense, <u>Joint Publication 1-02</u>, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 9 January 2003), 197.
- ²⁴ U.S. Department of the Army Public Affairs Office. <u>The Army Budget, Fiscal Year 2003</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 4 February 2002), 1-6.
- ²⁵ U.S. Department of the Navy. <u>FY 2003 Department of the Navy Budget</u>. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, February 2003), Appendix A.
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- ²⁷ Jim Lai. "The Future of Infantry." Mindjack, 28 January 2002; available from http://www.mindjack.com/feature/landwarrior.html; Internet; accessed 7 October 2002.
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- ²⁹ U.S. Marine Corps. <u>Marine Corps Strategy 21</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Navy, 3 November 2000), 3.
- ³⁰ Vincent Davis, <u>Defense Reorganization and National Security</u>, American Defense Policy, 7th Edition (Baltimore, MD.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 126.
- ³¹ M. Thomas Davis. "The JROC: Doing What? Going Where?, <u>National Security Studies</u> <u>Quarterly</u>, (Summer 1998): 2.
 - ³² Ibid., 3.
 - ³³ Ibid., 9.
 - ³⁴ Ibid., 11.
 - ³⁵ Ibid., 12.

³⁶ General Eric Shinseki. <u>The Army Vision</u>. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 19 September 1999), 1-3.

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³⁸ Ibid., 23.

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